Book Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira – freewebdesing.com
Book Fiasco The American Military Adventure in Ira – freewebdesing.com
Although there is lots of detail rovided in this aptly titled book about the fiasco that has been the US adventure in Ira that isn t really the main Aristoteles-Rezeption in Der Geschichtstheorie Johann Gustav Droysens point of this book or the reason why anyone should read it It is also not the main lesson to be gained from reading it This book is than anything else an extended meditation on the central importance that military strategy ought to havelayed in the Announcing A New School preparations execution and most importantly theeace that was to have followed the invasion of Ira To make this Afganistano kariai plain early in the book an important definition isrovided strategy That is a grand sounding word and it is freuently misused by laymen as a synonym for tactics In fact strategy has a very different and uite simple meaning that flows from just one short set of uestions Who are we and what are we ultimately trying to do here How will we do it and what resources and means will we employ in doing it The four answers give rise to one s strategy Ideally one s tactics will then follow from them that is this is who we are this is the outcome we wish to achieve this is how we aim to do it and this is what we will use to do it But addressing the uestions well can be surprisingly difficult and if the answers are incorrect or incomplete or the goals listed not reachable then the conseuences can be disastrous As someone once said strategy is the science tactics the art The failures in Ira were in both science and art but the reasons for these failures are Cuckold Fantasies placed suarely on the failure of strategy and leadershipThe fact is repeatedly made that the US was never uite sure who the we were in this conflict and therefore made repeated mistakes in understanding what we were supposed to be doing in Ira and therefore what it would take to do itThere is a wonderfulart where it is explained that one of the major strategies was that a truly international force would spontaneously assemble to manage the The Last Thing You Said peace when this miracle assembly of an international force did not eventuate there uite simply was no Plan B The central link to all of these mistakes was the leadership in Washington who so strongly believed their own version of reality that they simply could not conceive theossibility of their being wrong A truly stupid All We Leave Behind person is someone who can never admit to being wrong ever And this maxim has never held true than it did in Washington throughout the Bush Administration s handling of the Ira invasion No amount of evidence from the field was ever allowed to stand in the way of the absolute conviction that everything was going along swimmingly and working out tolanIf like me you would gladly eat Bill Gates alive for inflicting PowerPoint on the world this book will help you to justify your loathing It seemed that orders were rarely given from the Pentagon other than in the form of a PowerPoint resentation Oh Microsoft you have much to answer for Before the War I saw an interview on Australian television with a military historian of some description He was asked what will happen if it turns out that no weapons of mass destruction are found in Ira no chemical weapons lants no stores of biological weapons People were already wondering why these weapons hadn t been used against the forces while they were assembled on the Irai boarder rather than waiting for these to invade when it would seem a bit too late The guy responded in much the way I would have responded I guess in a way that utterly confirmed every cynics deepest fears by saying that the US would either find WMD or the US military would have to manufacture them Either way it was simply not an option to invade Ira and then not find weapons of mass destruction that much was abundantly clearWhen I was younger I liked to believe that somewhere in the US there were a group of conspirators maybe the CIA or How to Play Electric Guitar. Tony Skinner, Alan Brown Jake Jackson perhaps something even shadowy and secret who would sit around a table and maybe that table would even be round and developlans for total world domination I couldn t say if they sat with cats on their knees that they stroked constantly or even if they had revolving bookcases where those who sought to undermine US interests would be brought to be Jane Wolfe (Red Flame, Vol. 10) punished or even if thisunishment would involve large numbers of Beyond the Far Horizon piranha All I was sure of was that someone was in charge and someone knew what was going on and when stuff happened it happened for a reason of their choosing and that reason was designed to always further US interestsI imagine someeople might well think that this was a terrible and frightening vision of the world and of US foreign Clan Novel (Vampire: The Masquerade: Clan Novel policy I guess they would even be grateful that I have beenroven wrong I m not so sure that I am glad I ve been Death of a Gunfighter proven wrong I still haven t uite gotten over the shock of Bush effectively saying Well heck we ve looked and looked but I ll be damned if we can find those WMDs anywhere Oh well I drobably say C est la vie but I hate those damn cheese eating surrender monkeys so much I ll just have to say at least we re all free It is one thing to mess around with the world when you have a Spanking Britney (Spanking Fantasies, plan but to do so when the full extent of yourost invasion The Old Woman Whose Rolling Pin is the Sun plan is Once we ve kick in the door theeople who live there will be so delighted to see us that they re bound to throw a Was Jonestown a CIA Medical Experiment? party is terrifying I think I wouldrefer the guy with the cat to be uite honestThere were Void parts of this book where it was clear that if there had been a strategy to win theeace in Ira that is if US soldiers had not so consistently alienated the civilian opulation then things might have worked out uite differently My favourite uote was from a soldier who said that the only things the Irais understood were force and violence Given the soldier was unable to speak any of the local language and had no awareness of the local culture that he was slamming his boot into the face of his assessment was robably completely accurate the only way he could Love, Laughter, and Merrily Ever Afters possibly make himself understood was by smashing someone and nearly frightening them to death That this could not be in the long term interests of the invadingower hardly needs to be said Or maybe it needs to be said over and over and over again I can t decide whichNot everyone in Ira not even all of those in the leadership of the US forces comes out of this book badly General Petraeus seems like a man with his head screwed on Freshman Rivals (Freshman Dorm, properly and one of the very feweople of any authority who comes out of this book reasonably well Many Death Valley in 49 people soldiers invariable understood early on in theiece that they were fighting an insurgency and therefore knew that what was needed was to use counter insurgency tactics to win the hearts and minds of the local opulation that they needed to do whatever it took to not further alienate the locals That those who ought to have been roviding the strategy to facilitate this understanding were in fact actively undermining any talk of an insurgency meant that any hope of a coordinated effort that followed an effective strategy was doomed to failure When those with the task of The True Story of the Bilderberg Group providing leadership run around saying that every American soldier killed isroof that things are getting better I guess the logic being its counter intuitive so therefore it must be right can t but have made those on the ground feel increasingly cynical and dispirited As someone said we will win every battle here and still end up losing the war because we aren t fighting the kind of war that would allow us to win As you can see this book s long meditation on the importance of strategy continues from start to finishIt is interesting to note that every aim stated When I Grow Up (Tales From Foster High, prior to going to war by the Bush administration has subseuently failed to be realised If you wanted to believe in a God that finds ironic ways tounish hubris this could easily serve as a defining example of that God s works I don t just mean that we never found WMD but Ira could hardly be seen today as the example to the rest of the Middle East of the benefits of democracy that was once one of the stated aims of the war Ira wasn t Arachne previously involved in terrorism but now it is the Middle East s most effective training ground for radical Islamic terror fighters It would be hard to make up a comprehensive failure of both vision andolicy I guess it is uite an achievement when Rock Lead Basics people like Bush Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz have gotten it so wrong and are still able in their own minds to say they have gotten everything completely right well at least it defies satireThis isn t just my ownersonal hindsight bias talking Many Lightning Over Bennett Ranch people and the deepest and saddest irony being that many of theseeople were in the US military warned against this absurd adventure only to be ignored and worse by their civilian leaders This is a remarkable book and one that Sri Sumarah, Pariyem dan Bu Bei provides a very disturbing insight into the asylum that for a frighteningly long time had been taken over by the lunatics If humans were able to learn from history then this fiasco would be one of the lessons I wouldut on the curriculum Retrospective on another important book Class Struggles published some years ago on Ira How has the work held upThomas Ricks book Fiasco wasart of an increasing body of literature featuring and books based on the words and experiences of insiders government and military officials talking after the fact raising uestions about the wisdom of the original decision to invade Ira and the occupation and nation building efforts thereafter This work and others as well raises important uestions about the extent to which the American effort to create democratic nation building in Ira was doomed from the start Any number of books and articles in the subject of what it takes to create democracy and what it takes to engineer democracies speak to a Wilfred Owen (Routledge Revivals) project that had a low chance of success from the get go And given the strategic and tactical errors of the United States those originally low odds of success became lower still So Fiasco is one among several works that raised serious uestions about the outcome of the American experiment in democratic nation building in Ira Ricks book is useful in this context to thisoint it is one of the best efforts at getting insights and accounts from insiders Again we need to be somewhat cautious about the many sources who spoke with the author Some have axes to grind others are not necessarily the most credible sources Nonetheless this work in combination with others that have appeared raises interesting and important uestions and is an important work to explore Ira as of early 2011 appears to be wobbly but it has become a independent state and the mechanisms of government created over the Study to Teach past several years creak along Werobably need a bit time to see how things end up but many of the negative analyses such as Ricks may well have been too negative Again though we need to see how history works itself out Touted by John McCain and others as the definitive Ira War book Fiasco gives a detailed blow by blow account of the US 2003 invasion of Ira Writing as objectively as Global Corporations in Global Governance possible Ricks nevertheless gives a scathing account of the mismanagement of the war by Donald Rumsfeld Paul Bremer Paul Wolfowitz Doug Feith and the fiasco s chief architectsThe book is fascinating on many levels showing whereeople went wrong not only tactically but also ideologically Interestingly the only Angels in Harmony person who comes out looking good is Petreus who Bush recentlyut in charge Too little too late What most surprised me about the book is that it gives the impression that with better management and a Sketchy Behavior plan the invasion might have actually worked out on some level aroposition I had been reluctant to believeThe book concludes with four scenarios of what will happen when we leave the bad the worse the worst an a chilling fourth nightmare scenario If you re reluctant to buy this just read this last Autumn Brides part while standing in the aisle at Borders The failure of the 1991 Gulf War to take out Saddam Hussein left a small contingent of hawks looking for redress Most notable among these was then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz who reported to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney As aolicy of containment took hold Wolfowitz complained for action against Saddam but in the Bush 41 administration he did not find a receptive ear from Cheney Wolfowitz s disdain for containment may have been due to the loss of most of his Polish extended family in the holocaust Wolfowitz. This is the Story of The American Military Adventure in Ira The Heart of the story Fiasco has to tell which.
Compared Saddam to Hitler and his security forces to the Gestapo Another advocate for action was Donald Rumsfeld who along with Wolfowitz and John Bolton belonged to an advocacy group that issued a letter to President Clinton in 1998 demanding regime change in Ira Even though in the 2000 The Princess and the Three Knights presidential election Bush and Cheney doubled down on a non interventionistolicy Bush made Donald Rumsfeld Defense Secretary and Wolfowitz Deputy Defense Secretary Initially however Wolfowitz s only strong interventionist ally in the Bush administration was Scooter Libby Cheney s chief of staff911 changed everything Rumsfeld became disillusioned with the intelligence community and again sided with Wolfowitz Then the New York Times chimed in with reporting by Pulitzer Prize winning columnist Judith Miller claiming Ira had a WMD The Beauty of Believing program housed in multiple hidden sites None of it was true but it had a big impact Bush made sure everyone knew that his administration s attitude had changed in his 2002 state of the union speech when he declared Ira along with North Korea and Iran to be an axis of evil arming to threaten theeace of the worldtime is not on our side I will not wait on events while dangers gather Cheney reiterated in August 2002 saying We must take the battle to the enemy claiming There is no doubt Ira has WMD This would be Sticky Church proven false and to have been based on cherryicked bits of intelligence selected to Forbidden Love Unchained prove what the hardliners already believed Cheney radically changed after 911erhaps from fear of a repetition but also Witches of the Deep South perhaps because he was suffering from serious heartroblems The hardliners reinforced each other and Cheney in Metro 2033 (Universo Metro) particular intimidated the intelligence community Cheney sressure culminated in CIA Director George Tenet releasing a made to order National Intelligence Estimate summary supporting the WMD case that heavily influenced President Bush The detailed report was far less clear than the summary In September 2002 NY Times columnist Judith Miller struck again this time on Christianity page one writing that Saddam Hussein was actively searching for A bombarts later Run for Your Life (Michael Bennett, proven false By the fall of 2002 with the decision to go to war made and Congress offering no serious opposition Rumsfeld beganlanning Unlike Cheney in the Gulf War Rumsfeld overrode his military scaling back reuired force estimates Alice-Miranda at Camp particularly for the aftermath Calling itlanning is really a misnomer Inexperienced civilian hardliners The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature (Penguin Press Science) (English Edition) put together PowerPoints on what to expect Input from experiencedeople in the State Department or military was largely ignored Those that objected such as knowledgeable former generals Shinseki and Zinni were vilified The official line was that the troops would be welcomed as liberators uickly turn the government back over to the Irais and leave It was all The Association of Small Bombs politically generated and na ve In February 2003 Secretary of State Colin Powell with Tenet sitting behind him gave a speech at the UN offering evidence of Irai WMD This abysmal lowoint in his career came about because he accepted the CIA summary and unverified input from the administration all of which was crafted to support a decision already made The US attacked in March 2003 Taking Baghdad Wilderness Survival Handbook proceededretty much as The White Mans Burden planned Little else did The Irai troops didn t defect in mass and support the Americans as the administration hadredicted Once defeated most waited to see what the Americans would do Some melted into the civilian Visit the Sick population and began organizing resistance starting by stocking up on arms that Saddam had stashed around the country General Franks did not take responsibility for what followed in Ira after his victory in taking Baghdad The US had nolan to administer Ira after Saddam s fall US forces didn t secure the borders seize Saddam s arm stashes or maintain order Chaos ensued with widespread looting and vandalism American troops never expected to be an occupation force for which they were severely undermanned Some were busy hunting for WMDs that didn t exist Others were getting ready to go home as they had been Carry Me Over the Threshold promised Irais figured Americans didn t care or simply were incapable of taking control They soon lost any faith they may have had in their liberators Meanwhile on May 1 2003 Bush was uick to claim victory flying in a combat jet onto the deck of an aircraft carrier over which a banner claimed mission accomplished In May 2003 as the situation in Ira continued to deteriorate Paul Bremer was appointed to head the Coalition Provisional Authority He technically reported to Rumsfeld but Rumsfeld thought he reported to the White House National Security Council It didn t matter because Bremer did what he wanted General Franks was replaced by General Sanchez who reported to Central Command in Tampa which reported to Rumsfeld No singleerson in Ira was in charge and Bremer and Sanchez could barely stand each other Bremer wasted no time disenfranchising Irais First he fired all senior Baathist The Courtship Basket party members from government run organizations Thatut 85000 Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, 1 2 Samuel (The Expositors Bible Commentary people who knew how to operate the country s infrastructure on the street without jobs Next he dissolved the Irai Armyutting 385000 men on the streets with no income and Small Talk plenty of time to express their resentment Then he let go the 285000 working for the Interior Ministry which includedolice and security forces The US Army had not been notified in advance of these decisions Even Rumsfeld didn t seem to know about these decisions Bremer s actions ensured the occupation would be a long one and Accidental Pharisees proved to be an excellent way to get the Irai insurgency up and running Bombing and sniping increased and was widespread within a couple of months But back in Washington the Bush administration denied that there was a seriousroblem and still expressed confidence that that they would find WMD In July when asked about Irais attacking U S forces Bush said My answer is Bring em on A year later the Islamic Jihad Army replied Have you another challenge Bombings increased Particularly significant was the bomb laden truck that crashed into the UN mission in Ira in August 2003 killing twenty two and wounding seventy The blast broke windows a half mile away The UN reduced its resence to a token and ceased being the mediator between the US and Shiite leaders Other international organizations took note and began leaving The insurgency was being strategic cutting Americans off from constructive contact with Irais American forces were a hammer in search of a nail The US employed counterproductive conventional war tactics with ard vehicles atrolling through Irai neighborhoods mass roundups and imprisonments nighttime raids on Light Thickens (Roderick Alleyn, personal residences humiliating men in front of their familieshysical and mental abuse of detainees all guaranteed to alienate everyday Irais As Irai animosity intensified the IED the low tech roadside bomb became the weapon of choice for the insurgents The IED was very effective It was responsible for one third of US troop deaths in the insurgency s first year and two thirds of casualties reuiring medical evacuation out of Ira IED attacks would steadily increase throughout 2004 The IED further isolated US troops who became very reluctant to venture out among the Irais except as ordered on combat style missions General Sanchez A Multi-Site Church Roadtrip provided little central direction thus area commanders used varying tactics somearticularly harsh and alienating but a few such as General Petraeus in the Irai north employed Magic Dreams (Kate Daniels, proven counterinsurgency measures to good effect Counterinsurgency calls for winning over theeople by engaging with them and respecting them the opposite of what most US divisions were doingIn early October 2003 Bush still had the blinders on saying The situation is improving on a daily basis in Ira People are freer the security situation is getting better That month the Ramadan offensive got underway The insurgents sent a message to the US by launching rockets into the heavily The End of Intelligent Writing protected American Green Zone Rockets struck the hotel where Wolfowitz was staying killing an Army officer on the floor below They also sent a message to Irais working with the Americans assassinating one of the Baghdad mayors Violence dramatically escalated to 45 attackser day on American forces US helicopters were shot down 60 US troops were killed in two weeks All in all by November US troops had been killed from May to November 2003 than in the US invasion Rumsfeld and the Bush administration s Introduction to Orthotics plans still called for reducing US troop strength based on their belief that things were going well but now doubts crept in Finally Rumsfeld changed his tune sayingublically We re in a low intensity war that needs to be won Even the capture of Saddam Hussain in December didn t help Many Irai s felt now they could join the resistance since they would no longer be fighting for SaddamThe US Army was given the unexpected role of administering Irai I-O prisons including tens of thousands of detainees collected in the growing number of cordon and sweep operations While targeting known insurgents many innocent suspects were routinely detained in the sweeps and sent off torison Abu Ghraib the main டணாயக்கன் கோட்டை [Danaayakkan Kottai] prison was overwhelmed Prisoners waited weeks and months to be interrogated Many were simply lost in the system The reserve MP troops running therison were not Understanding Central Asia properly trained or supervised and abuse wasrevalent not that abuse was confined to the Vietcong prisons Individual field divisions varied widely in their treatment of detained Irais Detainees were freuently subject to violence and humiliation before enteringrison Ricks spends many Mastering the Mystical Heptarchy pages describing the myriad waysrisoners were mistreated injured and sometimes killed and much became Relatos inconfesables de un monje public Then the news about abu Ghraib broke in April 2004 Americans Irais andeople around the world were stunned Military leaders could claim they were unaware of much of the abuse in the field and The Gentleman Mentor (Lessons with the Dom, prisons largely because many commanders had let it be known that they didn t want to hear about itAs 2004 unfolded the Irai insurgency hardened and spread Now the insurgents were better euipped and experienced But US forces rotated out after one year Their replacements had to learn all over again how war in Ira was fought It wasn t the war they were trained to fight The few good working relationships between Irai and US forces were lost A significant failure of those leaving was notroperly training euipping and supporting Irai forces the US had recruited This was essential given the inability of Americans to understand and deal with The German Occupation Of Jersey people of a different culture and language Another failure that undercut attempts to implement counterinsurgency doctrine was notroviding security for the majority of Irais who were not insurgents The average Irai was terrified by uncontrolled crime Kidnappings robberies and rapes were commonplace If the US couldn t rotect them better to align with the insurgents Another failure was not getting basic services up and running What were Irais with no electricity to think when they saw the bright lights emanating from the green zoneIn March 2004 Fallujah exploded A group of Blackwater security contractors bypassed a marine checkpoint were ambushed dismembered hung from a bridge then burned to cheering crowds General Mattis and his Marines had taken over from the army in Fallujah just days earlier Mattis saw this as a loy by the insurgents to draw them into a major battle Mattis who had trained his troops in counterinsurgency tactics wanted to wait then go after just the insurgents responsible to maintain relations with city residents He and his military bosses including Sanchez were overruled President Bush demanded major action immediately to offset the images on TV Without time to gather intelligence the marines went in clearing the city block by block in intense fighting The fighting spread to nearby Ramadi then Shiite militias attacked the south of Ira and in Shiite enclaves in Baghdad Sunni and Shiite attacks spread to other cities Attacks on convoys increased sharply Irai troops that Americans had recruited refused to fight other Irais In April President Bush inexplicably said Most of Fallujah is returning to normal Nothing could have been further from the truth The marines were forced by Bush to turn the city back over to those they had been fighting so he could claim victory The war strategy was being directed Has never been told before is that of a Military occupation whose leaders failed to see a blooming insurge.
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Olitically and ineptly from the White House Ira was on fire the insurgents were winning battles and the Mr. Sheriff (Mr. Series, people fell in line At one US battalion H a sign read Dilbert of the Day The key to happiness is self delusion Ricks goes on to describe many other battles As 2004 rolled into summer both sides improved their tactics but the US still lacked a strategy to win or end the war echoing Viet Nam Special Forces were not being used effectively but given the debacle of conventional warfare in 2004 by 2005 they would be seen as the answer Special Forces were designed to engage in small scalerecise actions designed to eliminate the enemy without alienating the There Is No I in Church people By 2005 twoillars of the rationale for invasion were laid to rest There were no WMD and no linkage between Saddam Hussain s regime and al aeda The third Rules Compendium (Babylon 5 Wars, 2nd Edition) pillar of the rationale liberation also looked incredibly weak After abu Ghraib and the toll of destruction and death experienced by everyday Irais how could it be said they were better off The New York Times and other newspapers that had lent support to the war hawks changed their tune Congress chimed in and began criticizing the administration for the handling of the war The fallaciousness of Judith Miller s reporting was exposed and she left the Times in 2005 In mid 2004 Bremer and General Sanchez were replaced The new leadership began the transition to counterinsurgency tactics In November 2004 the second battle of Fallujah began This time with three times the number of troops months oflanning and the use of Special Operations the marines took the city in fierce methodical block by block house to house combat Much of the fighting was at close uarters but the marines also fired four thousand artillery rounds and ten thousand mortar shells supplemented by ten tons of bombs dropped from the air Two thousand buildings in Fallujah were destroyed and ten thousand damaged The battle was important to show that the insurgents were not the inevitable winners but the destruction of Fallujah was hardly going to endear the residents to their liberators The death of residents was minimized since almost all left the city before the battle beganIn 2005 the insurgency became sophisticated and expanded The US began implementing new tactics that were anathema in 2003 This is where Ricks leaves us the book How to Stop Living Paycheck to Paycheck published in 2006 The takeaways areretty obvious A Baroque Rococo politically driven disastrous war was entered into by an administration motivated byaranoid beliefs an administration that isolated itself ignoring experienced and knowledgeable input an administration that bought into any story that supported its Crooked House preconceived notions an administration that could never admit it made mistakes an administration living in a delusion Ricks ends by exploringossible scenarios for the future of Ira He considers civil and regional war as Adaptation (Genus: Unknown, possibilities Many of these scenarios and are stillossible as our latest Elysian Fields (Sentinels of New Orleans, president know it all tinkers with forces he doesn t understand in the Middle East maintaining America s involvement in the Yemini Civil War and taunting Iran Reading how the Bush administration drove America to war in Ira sends a chill down my spine when I think about how our currentresident employs the same modus operandi This is the definitive book on the Ira War to date It A Winter Tale (Lake Emerald Chronicles provides ample evidence that the GW Bush regime along with the Pentagon and the CIA made a false casus belli for war with Ira keenly anticipating an easy victory with Irais greeting American soldiers with garlands of flowers as liberators That alas was not to be Further what was galling was that the US had absolutely NO comprehesivelan or set of Dedication and Leadership Techniques plans for rebuilding the Irai economy and re establishing basic services for the Iraieople By basic services I mean water electricity sanitation services and civil institutions such as the courts and fire and 神様 [Kamisama] police services Nor were enough troopsrovided not only for waging the war but also for securing the borders and laying the foundations for a timely return to normality in Ira What was also appalling was that the US government rincipally used the services of organizations sent to restore basic services in Ira which were made up of eople who had ABSOLUTELY NO TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE for the reconstruction The Full Experience projects they headed Indeed many of theseeople several of them were recent college graduates were chosen because of their olitical fealty to Bush CheneyTo uote the author it now seems likely history s judgment will be that the US invasion of Ira in the spring of 2003 was based on erhaps the worst war Voodoo Season plan in American history It was a campaignlan for a few battles not a The Walking Dead Live! plan torevail and secure victory Its incompleteness helped create the conditions for the difficult occupation that followed The invasion is of interest now mainly for its role in creating those Scotty Scotts Guide to Relationships problemsI strongly urge any discerning reader with an interest in US foreignolicy to read this book with care comparing it with David Halberstam s The Best and the Brightest I ve always enjoyed Thomas Ricks reporting in WaPo WSJ etc as well as his earlier book Making the Corps What I appreciated most about Fiasco was its crisp rose and simple level headedness In that Fiasco confirmed a belief that I have slowly been coming to that even after we invaded Ira it still really might have been ok not good necessarily but ok But we blew opportunity after opportunity to do the right thing and it really is unredeemable now The thing that weirds me out the most though Realizing how much of this basic narrative was available to me while I was neck deep in grad school Granted I was a military history freak in jr high and high school and still read the news avidly even during seminary But if I could spot so many of our military and olicy missteps as an overworked theology student what the hell was our White House and DOD doing Wasn t it their job to ay attention How bad was their information stream anyway Or were they really that arrogantly impervious to uncomfortable truths Depressing but enlightening Thomas Ricks image from the Bangor Daily News Fiasco offers a very detailed look into the disaster that has been the US invasion of Ira For those of us who have read than a few books on the subject there is an unavoidable repetition of information seen elsewhere but there is sufficient new material to justify one s time Ricks covers the range of errors from the olitical to the strategic to the tactical to the diplomatic and offered analysis as to what went wrong and why But he also shows where lessons were learned from recent experience although one of the major failures of the war was an unwillingness to learn from Written in Red Ink prior conflicts and tells of success stories where they occurred I learned about some of the militaryeople involved in the war Generals Franks Petraeus Odierno Sanchez McMaster than I knew before and that alone was worth the Crash Landing (Bear Creek, price The book offers an excellent range of subject matter and is written in a very accessible manner EXTRA STUFFLinks to the author at Task Purpose and Twitter Thomas Ricks work at The Atlantic The Daily Beast Foreign Policy Research Institute When Fiasco first came out naturally there were many opinions on it ranging from fantastic to trash I kept some of the bad reviews I d seen and heard in mind as I read this book trying to look for evidence torove those bad reviews were well founded Frankly I didn t find any such evidence Two things come to mind here Firstly in one community online that I Piper peek into now and then I skimmed over a discussion on the boards about it a few months ago Oneerson argued the title of the book stating it was unfair to judge this war by such a title a fiasco until the war had come to a close and we had all evidence to judge by Something about that statement didn t uite sit well with me but I thought sure there might be a valid The Famoux (The Famoux, point to that at least looking at it from one angle From a different angle however I think it sossible to judge based on Dragons Gap progress reports How else are you going to know if you re being successful or not if you don t analyzerogress and make corrections where needed along the waySecondly Bared for Her Bear (Wylde Bears people have treated the book like it does nothing butoint out failures and ut the whole situation in a bad light a worse light than is actually necessary I totally disagree Read the book It reads like a history book with brief summaries of what happened when from events leading up to the actual invasion to the here and now and what was said by which key figures and at what oint on the time line Yes the failures were outlined and yes a lot of bad things have gone on over there But the successes that occurred over there however fleeting they may have been were also included I didn t find this a biased book at all I ve come away from reading it with a much much higher respect for our military My eyes have been opened to a lot and my view on this war has changed a bit which has surprised me I m not so sure I m one of those The Lone Star Groom: Bachelor Billionaire Romances people who is ready to demand we bring all our troops back home instantly I think as I have for years that they were unfairly thrown into a disaster waiting to happen But to add insult to injury they were given a small fraction of the resources needed to be successful and expected toerform miracles overnight How can you expect success when you don t have a clear lan for everything or the tools needed So yes regardless of who s to blame here it has been a fiasco in ways than one Now I think it s time they get the full support they need to do what needs to be done The only roblems that remain in my mind are the uestions of whether or not it s too late and whether or not the resources for full support exist It should ve been done right the first go round right from the start but we can t do much about the Crater Trueblood and the Lunar Rescue Company (Helium-3, past now unfortunatelyThis administration should truly be ashamed of itself Something else that resulted from reading this book was how utterly embarrassed I am of our government It s one thing to make mistakes but it s another to refuse to admit to being wrong and to refuse to do anything to right those wrongs At othereoples expense They have never seemed to grasp that it s not just their lives being affected by their ignorant decisionsGod help the next President who has to try to clean up this mess I had initially read the audio book of Ricks follow up to this book The Gamble and was impressed enough to get the To Protect His Mate (Wolfe Brothers, print version of Fiasco It did not disappoint as a book even if it highlighted theroblems with the current Ira WarRicks is a very fair judge He speaks well of many of the fine commanders on the ground men like Gen David Petreaus who are doing the best with what they have He faults Star Wars Rogue Squadron II Rogue Leader Instruction booklet primarily the dual response from Washington both civilian and some military to see a worst case scenario as a reason to go into Ira in the firstlace while counting on a best case scenario for an exit stradegy This leads to Boom poorlanning for the reconstruction hase and not enough eople asking What if Likewise Ricks is uick to Good Morning, Buddha point out when certain individuals do realize how bad things are and make adjustments for the better though institutionalizedroblems still exist for example if a battalion or division is making real Personal Delivery progress towards uieting things down it seems inevitable that the entire division would be rotated out for a less experienced with the locals replacement division who wouldn t have the trust of the locals Ricks finds fault with the civilian government news media Congress and some top commanders but he ultimately explains things in a clear and thorough manner Critically important but very difficult book to read As one who long supported Ira II to read such a thorough evisceration of the justification and strategicrosecution of the war was frankly heart rending There were errors of negligence bull headed ness stress at every level There are two hopeful elements first I learned of this book because it is being taught as art of the curriculum at West Point This demonstrates an atypical and invaluable institutional capacity for self learning Second although slowly the US military itself kept searching for tactical adjustments at the field level to the institutional failings of DC Great innovation rarely occurs at the center a strength of the West in general and the US military in specific. Ncy for what it was and as a result lead their soldiers in such a way that the insurgency became inevitable.
Thomas Edwin Tom Ricks born September 25 1955 is an American journalist who writes on defense topics He is a Pulitzer Prize winning former reporter for the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post He writes a blog at ForeignPolicycom and is a member of the Center for a New American Security a defense policy think tankHe lectures widely to the military and is a member of Harvard University